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24 Abstract 25 
26 DCEs are regularly used in health economics to elicit preferences for health care 
27 
28 products and programs.  There is growing recognition that DCEs can provide more 
29 
30 than information on preferences and in particular have the potential to contribute more 
31 directly to outcome measurement for use in economic evaluation.  Almost uniquely, 
32 
33 DCEs potentially can contribute to outcome measurement for use in both cost benefit 
34 
35 analysis and cost utility analysis.  Within this expanding remit, this paper provides: an 
36  overview of fundamental principles ofDCEs; guidance on the appropriate design, 37 
38 application, estimation and interpretation of DCEs, including a checklist; and an 
39 
40  outline of the research frontier paying attention to how the results can be used in 
41 
42 economic evaluation.  Our intention is to provide a resource for current practitioners 
43 as well as those considering undertaking a DCE, using DCE results in a 44 























DCEs involve generation  and analysis  of choice data, and creation  of hypothetical 
markets that can be constructed  to suit relevant research  questions.   Thus, DCEs can 
mimic existing markets  or elicit preferences  and values for goods/services for which 
markets  do not exist.  DCEs offer several advantages  in the health sector, the most 
important  of which is they provide rich data sources for economic  evaluation  and 
decision making,  allowing  investigation of many types of questions,  some of which 





4 1. Introduction 
5 
6 
7 Given exponential increases  in viable health technologies, the perennial  economic 
8 
9 problem of limited resources  and unlimited  claims on resources  is particularly 
10 
11 relevant  in the health sector.  Scarcity coupled with the need to make choices between 
12 completing  claims on resources  has focused  attention  on economic  evaluation, 13 
14 ranging from evaluation  of individual  pharmaceuticals, to evaluation  of appropriate 
15 
16 forms of health care financing and service delivery, all of which require valuation  of 
17 
18 health care and/or health outcomes.   In parallel, governments  and other funders  are 
19 increasingly interested  in public and patient preferences  to inform clinicaVpolicy 20 
21 decision making and improve adherence  with clinicaVpublic health programs.   In 
22 
23 planning  appropriate  levels of health care provision,  information  on expected demand 
24 is also crucial. 25 
26 
27 
28 The usual source of information  on the value attached to, and preferences  and demand 
29 
30 for, goods and services  is market, or revealed  preference  (RP), data.  However,  RP 
31 data are scarce in health due to[!] a) public/private insurance which means consumers 
32 
33 rarely face market prices, b) agency relationships common in health between patients 
34 
35 and doctors means it is unlikely  observed consumption is based solely on patient 
36  preferences,  and c) existence  of interventions  not yet in the market for which (by 37 
38 definition)  market data do not exist.  This suggests  a role for stated preferences  (SP), 
39 
40  or what individuals  say they would do rather than what they are observed to do.  SP 
41 
42 methods  commonly  used in the health sector to investigate preferences  and value 
43 health outcomes  include standard  gamble, time trade off, person trade off and 44 
45 contingent valuation[2 
46 
47 added to this list. 






















practice in DCEs has been a moving target, and 2) it is unwise to apply DCEs without 
 
thoroughly understanding theory, methods and how to interpret the results.  This 
highlights a need for guidance on proper design, application, estimation and 
interpretation of DCEs. 
Thus, the objectives of this paper are to provide: a) an overview of basic DCE 
principles, b) guidance on key factors to consider in undertaking and assessing the 








6 DCEs typically are implemented in surveys comprising several choice sets, each 
7 containing hypothetical options between which respondents choose.  Each option is 
8 
9 described by a set of attributes, and each attribute takes one of several levels. Levels 
10 
11 describe ranges over which attributes vary across options. For example, when 
12 choosing between GPs a key attribute might be travel time, with levels like 5, 15 or 60 13 
14 minutes.  Respondents make decisions about quality or price differentiated versions of 
15 
16 a good/service in a way that often requires them to make tradeoffs between attributes. 
17 
18 The resulting choices are analysed to estimate the contribution of the attributes/levels 
19 to overall utility. 20 
21 
22 
23 DCEs evolved out of research on axiomatic conjoint measurement (eg,[
3 4l) and 
24 Information Integration Theory (eg,['l) in psychology; random utility theory based 25 
26 discrete choice models in economics (eg,[6l), discrete multivariate statistical models 
27 
28 for contingency (crosstab) tables (eg,l'l) and the optimal design of statistical 
29 
experiments (eg,[8l). DCEs were pioneered in marketing by Louviere and Woodworth 
 
31 (1983i9l, but quickly spread into other fields including applied economics, 
32 
33 particularly transport (eg,[!OJ) and envirornnental economics (eg,[ 11l). 
34 
35 
36  Since the first health application in the early 1990s[12l, the number of studies has 37 
38 grown rapidly, see Ryan and Gerard (2003i13l and Ryan, Gerard and Amaya-Amaya 
39 
40  (2008)[14] for reviews of the literature and method.  Despite being popular, health 
41 16 
42 applications have been criticised[". l; and while much of the critique by Bryan and 
43 Dolan (2004i"l was fair, Lancsar and Donaldson (2005i17l noted that their critique 44 
45 largely applied to early DCE health applications, and was not a critique or 
46 

















that QALYs measure health related utility only under specific restrictions on 
consumers' utility functions[21• 22l, which has lead to renewed interest in CBA and 







4 research frontier.  Our intention is to provide a resource for current practitioners and 
5 
6 those considering undertaking a DCE, using DCE results in a policy/commercial 




11 To achieve these objectives the next section examines use of DCEs in economic 
12 evaluation in health to date.  Section 3 presents their theoretical underpinnings.  We 13 
14 discuss the process of designing, undertaking and interpreting DCEs in Section 4, 
15 
16 where we highlight key factors in assessing the quality of these studies, summarised 
17 
18 in a checklist.  Section 5 traces out the research frontier and Section 6 concludes. 
19 
20 
21 2. DCEs and Economic Evaluation 
22 
23 
24 Despite a longer tradition of cost benefit analysis (CBA) in economics, the dominant 25 
26 forms of evaluation in health economics have been cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) 
27 
28 and cost utility analysis (CUA). All three approaches combine benefits with resource 
29 
30 use required to achieve these benefits.  A key difference is the definition and scope of 
31 benefits moving from use of intermediate uni-dimensional outcomes measured in 
32 
33 physical units, such as change in peak flow in CEA, to a two dimensional unit 
34 
35 capturing health related quality of life and length of life, measured by Quality 
36  Adjusted Life Years (QALYsi18 19l, in CUA, to potentially capturing all forms of 37 
38 benefit (including health, non health and process benefits) using monetary valuation 
39 
40  inCBA. 
41 
42 
43 An obvious use of economic evaluation in the health sector is to evaluate 44 
45 pharmaceuticals and health technologies.  Assessment agencies around the world 
46 
47 primarily make decisions on cost per QALY.  A key advantage of measuring 
48  outcomes using QALYs is their generic nature which can avoid the need for repeated 
 
50 valuation exercises.  However, when making decisions in the health sector, consumers 
51 














consumer  theory are preference-based and choice-based; the former assumes decision 
makers have a preference  relation over a set of possible choices that satisfies  certain 





4 So where do DCEs fit in economic  analysis  in health?  We see DCEs contributing in 
5 
6 two main areas:  I) eliciting  preferences,  quantifying tradeoffs  and predicting  uptake 
7 to inform policy development and analysis;  and 2) measuring  outcomes  for inclusion 
8 
9 in economic  evaluation.   Initially applications  focused  on the first area, primarily 
10 
11 eliciting  patient preferences  and tradeoffs for features  describing  products  or 
12 programs  in clinical settings (e.g[23.
  
l), and also in broader contexts  like GP's 
25 
13 
14 preferred  remuneration packages[26l·, preferred  health insurance  packages (e.g[27l), 
15 
16 types of health service configurations (e.g[28• 29l), and exploring  time preference 
17 30 
18 (e.g.[ l).  The initial focus was on non-health  outcomes  and process characteristics 
19 with less attention  paid to valuing  health outcomes.   More recently,  recognition  is 20 
21 growing that DCEs can provide more than preference  information; for example, DCEs 
22 
23 can be used to study the expected uptake of new policies/products (e.g.[
31 33 
) and . ] 
24 value health outcomes  (e.g[34" 35l). 25 
26 
27 
28 Ahnost uniquely, DCEs potentially can provide inputs to both CBA and CUA, 
29 
30 facilitating focus on the second of the two areas above.  DCEs are increasingly  used to 
31 elicit WTP for individual  characteristics of goods/services and monetary  measures  of 
32 
33 benefits as a whole for potential use in CBA[36  37 DCEs facilitate valuation  of •        ] 
34 
35 multiple options rather than evaluating  a single intervention  or treatment.   The 
36  feasibility of eliciting  utility weights from DCEs to be used to calculate  QALYs is 37 
38 also being explored[34• 38  39 A possible  advantage  of using DCEs to elicit such •        ] 
39 
40  weights is their grounding  in utility theory.  However,  we are unaware ofDCE- 
41 
42 derived outcome  measures  being used in CBA or CUA to date; we return to the 
43 potential expanded  role for DCEs in economic  evaluation  in the penultimate  section. 44 
45 
46 
47 3. Theoretical basis 
48 
49 
50 DCEs represent an integration  of several theoretical  areas.  They are consistent  with 
51 
52  Lancaster's characteristics theory of demand:  consumers  have preferences  for and 
53 














consumer  theory are preference-based and choice-based; the former assumes decision 
makers have a preference  relation over a set of possible choices that satisfies  certain 


















choices. We assume a respondent chooses option I if and only if its utility is higher 
 






4 continuity), while the latter focuses on decision makers' choices, which are assumed 
5 
6 consistent with the weak axiom of revealed preference (see comparison in Lancsar 
7 and Louviere 2006[42l). The DCE approach to preference elicitation is akin to the 
8 
9 choice-based approach to consumer theory as it explicitly assumes that choices 
10 
11 observed in DCEs 'reveal the preferences' of individuals.  Hypothetical alternatives 
12 offered in DCE surveys are constructed using experimental design theory, which is 13 
14 discussed in Section 4. 
15 
16 
17 6  43 
18 Choices made in DCEs are analysed using random utility theory (RUTi • ] which 
19 posits that utility for individual i conditional on choice j can be decomposed into an 20 








29 Economists view random components as due to unobservable or unobserved 
30 
31 attributes, unobserved preference variation, specification error and/or measurement 
32 
33 error[44J; psychologists view this component as being due to inherent variability within 34 
35 
and between individuals[4s] The systematic component is a function of (at least) 
37 
38 attributes of alternative and characteristics (covariates) of individual choosers, often 
39 
40  modelled as 41 
42 
43 
44                          (2) 45 
46 
47 
48  where  X ij  is the vector of attributes, usually including price and quality, of the jth 
49 
50 good as viewed by the ith  individual and z, is a vector of characteristics of 51 


















DCEs involve three main inter-related  components: I) an experimental design used to 
 









4 probability  distribution  for s,, the probability  that utility is maximised  by choosing 
5 
6 option  I is given by 
7 
8 
9 P(Y, =I)= P(U" > U,) 10 
11 = P(V,, + "" > V, + s,) 
13 = P(V,, -V, > s, - "")  Vj * I (3) 
14 
15 
16 Where Y; is a random variable denoting the choice outcome.   Estimable  choice models 17 
18 are derived by assuming  a distribution  for the random component. For example, if the 
19 
20 errors are independently and identically distributed  as extreme value type  I random 
21 









31 Using equation (2), equation (4) can be rewritten as 
32 
33 
34 e"(x;, +z;,I 





40  Equations  (4) and (5) have an embedded  scale parameter, f.l, that is inversely 41 
42 proportional  to the variance  of the error distribution,  a" ; thus parameter  estimates 43 
44 returned by estimation  algorithms  are  f31aco, not f}46 45 f.l cannot be identified  in any one 
46 data source, so is usually set to one[11J; ratios of scale parameters  can be identified 
47 
48  from two or more data sources.   Such "variance-scale ratios" account for differences 
49 in unobserved  variability  in the data sources, and can be specified  as functions  of 50 


















out, choose neither option, or choose status quo options should be considered, 
 





4 estimate preferences from the choice data; and 3) use of the resulting model to derive 
5 
6 welfare measures and conduct other policy analyses.  We discuss each in tum and 




11 4.1 Designing an experiment to generate choice data 
12 
13 




18 Proper design and implementation of DCEs requires consideration of the choice 
19 context, nature and composition of choice sets and framing of choice questions and 20 
21 instructions.  DCE choice questions must be incentive compatible so as to encourage 
22 




26 DCEs involve asking respondents to make discrete choices, in contrast with other SP 
27 
28 methods like conjoint analysis ranking and rating tasks.  Louviere and Lancsar 
29 49 
30 (2008i l compare these methods, and suggest reasons why traditional conjoint 
31 analysis is unlikely to be an appropriate way to elicit preferences or derive welfare 
32 
33  measures. 
34 
35 
36  Types of choice formats must be evaluated and should simulate the actual choice of 37 
38 interest as closely as possible.  Examples include choice between pairs of alternatives, 
39 
40  among multiple options, or binary yes/no choices.  A related decision is whether the 
41 
42 choice alternatives should be labelled (eg, chiropractor, physiotherapy) or generic (eg, 
43 drug A, drug B).  Labelled alternatives are specified in econometric analyses with 44 
45 alternative specific constants (ASCs, discussed below).  Unless respondents MUST 
46 
47 consume the good/service in practice, choice among hypothetical pairs (common in 
48  health applications) may be problematic as it implicitly assumes all respondents 
 
50 choose to consume the good/service[ so."l, forcing respondents to choose between two 
51 
52  potentially unappealing alternatives, neither of which may be chosen in practice.  This 
53 
54 raises questions of how to interpret the resulting preferences because they are 














Levels should be plausible and policy/clinically relevant, although DCEs can include 
currently unavailable but possible alternatives (eg "new horizon medications") by 






4 Modelling participation/uptake is particularly relevant for investigating policies that 
5 
6 depend on voluntary participation like lifestyle or other population health 
7 programs[3 l] From an evaluation perspective the comparator of interest is often a 
8 
9 status quo treatment.  If a status quo or opt out is included researchers must 
10 
11 understand what this means to respondents; for example, a status quo might be a 
12 reference point for gains and losses consistent with prospect theory[52 13 Status quo 
14 options can be constant for all respondents or can vary.  If it varies, researchers should 
15 
16 consider using what we call a "report card" that asks respondents to report the 
17 
18 attribute levels that most closely describe their particular status quo option; with 
19 reported values used in model estimation (for example, see[32l). 20 
21 
22 
23 Choices in health related DCEs may be complex and/or unfamiliar.  So, it is important 
24 to consider how much experience/knowledge respondents have with the good, and 25 
26 how much background information and/or "education" to provide to avoid 
27 
28 respondents making assumptions or bringing outside (and unknown to researchers) 
29 
30 information to the decision making process.  These issues are summarised in sections 




35 Define attributes and levels 
36 
37 
38 Attributes can be quantitative (eg, waiting time) or qualitative (eg, provider of 
39 
40  care) and are generally identified from literature, qualitative research like semi- 
41 
42 structured interviews and/or focus groups with samples of relevant respondents, and 
43 experts (eg clinicians/policy makersi'3 44 DCEs may not include every attribute 
45 important to every respondent, but it is important to capture attributes salient to the 
46 
47 majority to avoid respondents making inferences about omitted attributes.  Lancsar 
48  42 
49 and Louviere (2006)[ ] discuss methods to use in pilot tests to identify whether 
50 respondents consider omitted attributes.  Another consideration is whether attributes 
51 
52  should be generic (same levels for all alternatives) or alternative-specific (some 
53 
















The DCE data generation process rests heavily on an experimental design used 
to construct attribute combinations and choice sets. The design produces the 
estimation matrix, and respondents provide the dependent variable (choices) and 






4 avoid respondents ignoring attributes due to little difference in levels.  Level range is 
5 
6 particularly important for the price attribute if it is to be used to calculate implicit 
7 prices of other attributes using marginal rates of substitution (MRS).  For example, 
8 
9 Skjoldborg and Gryd-Hansen (2003i54l found that changing the price vector changed 
10 
11 parameter estimates and MRS (however, they note that changing the price vector 
12 compromised the experimental design, perhaps biasing results).  In contrast, Hanley et 13 
14 a!(2005i''l used an experiment to study the impact of changing the price vector and 
15 
16 found no significant impact on estimates after controlling for differences in variability 
17 
18 between samples (variance-scale ratios noted in Section 3).  The payment vehicle (and 
19 duration) should be chosen to match the type of good and setting, which is well- 20 
21 known in contingent valuation[56 
22 
Special attention is required to properly describe 
23 risk attributes (e.g. risk of morbidity or mortality associated with different health 
24 states) as evidence suggests people may have difficulty interpreting probabilities[S?] 25 
26 
27 
28 Types of attribute effects to be estimated also should be considered; for example, two- 
29 
30 level attributes only allow estimation of a linear effect, yet attributes often exhibit 
31 non-linear effects.  Evenly-spaced attribute levels can be useful for interpreting the 
32 
33 estimated effects of numerical attributes. 
34 
35 
36  Specification of suitable numbers of attributes and levels is context-specific, however 37 
38 DCEs in health have varied 12 attributes[ss] In some settings achieving clinical 
39 
40  relevance can required detailed attributes and levels thereby increasing complexity of 
41 
42 the design.  Researchers may inadvertently cause omitted variable bias by excluding 
43 key attributes, which should be weighed against task complexity due to too many 44 
45 attributes, which increases response variability.  Typically, rigorous and iterative 
46 
47 piloting is used to get the balance right.  These issues are summarised in sections 2, 3 





















considerations of numbers  of attributes  and task complexity. 
Full factorials  may be more feasible than many researchers  think, particularly  because 
 





4 design/estimation matrices  are fixed and known in advance. Thus, it behoves 
5 
6 researchers  to use optimal  designs. 
7 
8 
9 An experimental design is a sample from all possible  combinations of attribute  levels 
10 
11 used to construct choice alternatives  (or "profiles") and assign them to choice sets.  A 
12 complete  census of all attribute  level combinations  is a "full factorial" design.  For 13 
14 example, if there are A attributes  and all have L levels, the full factorial  is LA  A full 
15 
16 factorial  allows estimation  of all main effects (effect of each attribute)  and interaction 
17 
18 effects (effect of interaction  between two or more attributes)  independently of one 
19 another.   The number  of profiles in full factorials  is therefore  predetermined by the 20 
21 dimensions  of the attributes and levels and often is too large to be used in practice so 
22 
23 a "fractional factorial" is typically used, which is a sample from the full factorial 
24 selected such that all effects of interest can be estimated  (at a minimum,  the main 25 




30 The experimental design influences  the types of indirect utility functions  (IUFs) that 
31 can be estimated  from choices, so IUF functional  forms should be considered  a priori. 
32 
33 The design should allow estimation  of the most general specification possible  given 
34 
35 constraints.   Small fractional factorials  designs known  as orthogonal  main effects 
36  plans (OMEPs),  implying  a strictly additive IUF, typically  have been used in health; 37 
38 which may be convenient  but is rarely likely to be correct.  If IUFs are not strictly 
39 
40  additive, main effects are likely to be biased.  Lusk and Norwood  2005[59 
41 
suggest this 
42 is not the case, although  their simulation study used parameter values for non-linear 
43 terms and interactions  that were so small that their IUFs were close to additive.   More 44 
45 work is needed in this area.  In the meantime  larger fractional  designs that allow 
46 
47 estimation  of (at least) all two-way  interactions  minimise  potential for bias in main 
48 
49 effects and allow tests of whether  additive IUFs are correct.  Generally,  we 
50 recommend  avoiding small fractional  designs (i.e. designs only allowing  estimation  of 
51 
52  main effects) when possible  and instead recommend implementing the largest 
53 














(2005i60l note that many designs in the literature on DCEs exhibit identification 
 





4 verswns.   This provides more design points without increasing  numbers  of choice sets 
5 
6 for any one respondent.   For example, if there are 5 attributes,  three with 4-levels and 
7 two with 2-levels, the full factorial  produces  256 (43x22 
8 
combinations.  This can be 
9 blocked into 16 versions  of 16 choice sets with respondents  randomly  assigned to 
10 
11 version.   Fractional  factorial  designs also can be blocked into versions  (eg,[
32l). 
12 Typically, versions  are created by randomly  assigning  choice sets from the design to 13 
14 versions  without replacement; it may be possible to improve on this assignment,  but 
15 
16 as the number  of attributes and levels increase, it becomes difficult to avoid correlated 
17 
18 attributes within versions.  Nonetheless, one typically  can insure that all levels of each 
19 attribute appear at least once in each block.  If blocks are used, a version  variable 20 
21 should be included in the estimation  to control for version  effects. 
22 
23 
24 Designs  can be obtained from catalogues, created using software  or by hand; however 25 
26 created, their properties  must be examined.   Two key statistical  issues in design 
27 
28 construction are identification and efficiency.   Identification determines  the effects 
29 
30 that can be estimated  independently, which determines  the possible IUF 
31 specifications.  Independence of effects is determined  by the structure of the inverse 
32 
33 of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter  estimates,  denoted C1 (where Cis 
34 
35 known as the Fisher Information Matrix).   Effects  are independent  if C1 is block 
36  diagonal.  Efficiency  refers to the precision  with which effects are estimated;  more 37 
38 efficient designs give more precise parameter  estimates for a given sample size.  For 
39 
40  example, a design that is 50% efficient effectively "throws  away" half the sample 
41 
42 observations.  The efficiency  of a particular  design typically is measured  relative to 
43 that of an optimally  efficient design for the particular problem  of interest.   A widely 44 








53 where  p  is the number of parameters  to be estimated  in the model, C is defined 
54 














equally often), minimum  overlap (minimise  the overlap of levels for each attribute in 
each choice) and utility balance (options in each choice set have similar probabilities 





4 with one or more other effects.  Design ofDCEs is entirely under the control of the 
5 
6 researcher, so such identification problems  should not occur. 
7 
8 
9 Street and Burgess (2007i6'l developed  theory to produce optimally  or near optimally 
10 
11 efficient designs for conditionallogit models with strictly additive IUFs. Their 
12 designs create generic main effects DCEs for any choice set size for any number  of 13 
14 attributes with any number  of levels; they also provide theory to construct  DCEs for 
15 
16 main effects plus interactions  if all attributes  have 2levels.  While not yet available, 
17 
18 research  is in progress on optimally  efficient designs for experiments  with main 
19 effects and interactions  for more than two levels.  Unfortunately, except in very 20 
21 restrictive  circumstances, optimally  efficient  designs for alternative-specific (labelled) 
22 
23 DCEs are not yet available.   For the latter problems,  LMA designs are available,  where 
24 L is number  of levels, A number  of attributes andM number  of choice sets[39  62 •        ] 25 
26 
27 
28 As noted earlier, it often is appropriate to include constant alternatives  in choice sets 
29 
30 like 'none  of these' or status quo.  Such options can reduce design efficiency,  but 
31 typically  this is outweighed  by better congruency  with consumer  theory and 
32 
33 grounding  in reality.  It is worth noting, however, that optimally  efficient designs for 
34 
35 generic choices also are optimal when a 'none  of these'  option is included[6l] 
36 
37 
38 In health, profiles are often obtained from software  packages  like SPEED, SPSS and 
39 
40  SAS, and choice sets constructed  by randomly  selecting  one profile and pairing it with 
41 
all others. This is not only an inefficient  way to construct  DCEs[6'l, it also can lead to 
43 identification problems;  also, some software  options produce efficient designs, but 44 
45 these designs may not be block-diagonal, resulting  in parameter  estimates  being at 
46 
47 least somewhat confounded  with model intercept(s)  and/or some or all other 
48  attributes; hence, the resulting  estimates are not independent[6l] 49 
50 
51 
52  Huber and Zwerina ( 1996i63l propose what they consider to be desirable design 
53 
54 criteria: orthogonality (attribute  levels appear in choice sets with equal frequency  with 














randomly  replacing implausible profiles with plausible  profiles.   The first strategy 
may mean that effects of nested attributes cannot be separated; the last two strategies 








4 does not guarantee  an optimal design, and some designs that satisfy  these criteria may 
5 
not be identified.   For example, level balance is unnecessary for an optimal design and 
7 while minimal  overlap is associated  with optimal generic main effects designs, it 
8 
9 precludes  estimation  of interactions.   Viney et al (2005)[ 391 showed that utility balance 
10 
11 can increase the variance  of the error component, which, as highlighted in Section 3, 
12 can impact parameter  estimates.  Further,  if all options in each set are approximately 13 
14 equal in utility, there would be no reliable statistical  information  for model estimation. 
15 
16 Also some designs can lead to choice sets with identical profiles which in generic 
17 
18 designs is a design flaw that should be corrected. 
19 
20 
21 Health applications generally  have used small numbers of choice sets, often 8[ 131.  The 
22 
23 appropriate number of choice sets is context-specific, but there is evidence that 
24 respondents can cope with more than previously  considered.   For example, 32 choice 25 
26  sets per respondent have been reported  in the broader literature[64   651 with as many as , , 27 
28 28 used in health applications[321 
29 
Few studies have compared  responses  from 
 
66 68 
30 individuals  administered small versus large numbers of choice sets (e.g.[ -    1). 
31 Evidence  suggests  as numbers of attributes and/or choice options and/or choice sets 32 
33 and/or attribute differences  increase,  task complexity increases, which can increase 
34 
35 unobserved variability[661 New evidence  suggests these factors increase  unobserved 
36 variability  at approximately a logarithmic  rate[671 37 
 
So, decisions about these factors 
38 should be based on realistically simulating the market of interest (i.e., as complex  as 39 
40 the market, but no more so), and explored  in iterative  pilot tests. 
41 
42 
43 An important  issue is the possibility  of and methods to handle implausible attribute 44 
45 combinations.  That is, some minimum  level of attribute A may need to be present 
46 
47 before attribute B becomes relevant or a level of attribute  A may make no sense if 
48 
combined  with a level of attribute B.  For example,  an asthma medication that enables 49 
50 asthmatics  to participate in all strenuous/sporting activity  but does not allow 51 
52  participation in daily activities  makes little sense.   Possible solutions  involve nesting 
53 
54 attributes (eg, high ability of sporting activity nested with high ability to undertake 














estimating non linear discrete choice models from DCE data is complicated as it 
 
depends on the true values of the unknown parameters estimated in choice models.  It 
 





4 it imperative to check the resulting design properties.  When considering implausible 
5 
6 combinations, implausibility should be defined from respondents' perspective rather 
7 than clinically, thereby requiring pilot testing.  Key issues discussed above regarding 
8 
9 the creation of an experimental design are summarised in section 4 of Table II. 
10 
11 
12 Pilot tests 13 
14 
15 
16 As with all primary data collection methods, iterative face to face pilot testing 
17 
18 is needed to gnide development and testing ofDCE surveys.  This includes 
19 respondent understanding of choice contexts, generation and testing of 20 
21 appropriateness and understanding of attributes/levels, task complexity, length, timing 
22 
23 and likely response rates.  The importance we place on pilot testing is noted by the 
24 fact that we have discussed the need for piloting in the various stages of developing a 25 





31 Sampling requires considering the population to whom the results will be generalised, 
32 
33 opportunity costs regarding how programs are funded and relevant perspective (ex 
34 
35 ante or ex post).  Each has implications for relevant samples, or whose preferences to 
36  elicit, such as patients, care providers, tax payers/general public, policy 37 
38 makers/insurers. For example, if the good/service is to be paid for by private finance, 
39 
40  the opportunity cost is the alternative use of individual income; this suggests that the 
41 69 
42 population of interest is individual patients/users[ ] If instead, the product/program 
43 is to be paid out of taxes, often the case in economic evaluation in health, then the 44 
45 opportunity cost is the alternative use of these taxes; here the population of interest is 
46 
47 tax payers or the general population.  Additionally, if interested in ex post 
48  preferences, users of the good/service are appropriate.  Regardless of 'whose 
 




54 Sample size should be chosen to allow estimation of reliable models, subject to 














attributes  like quadratic  or cubic effects.  Effects  codes and mean-centering avoid 
correlations  with the ASCs/intercepts, allows interpretation of the ASCs/intercepts as 




4 numbers  of choice sets per respondent and numbers of respondents  in the sample.  A 
5 
6 useful discussion  of sampling  for choice models (primarily  for RP data) is provided in 
7 Ben-Akiva and Lerman  (1985i44l; Louviere, Hensher  and Swait (2000i62l provide 
8 
9 potentially  useful sample size calculations  for DCEs.  Specifically, if all respondents 
10 
11 receive the same design, the minimum  sample size is related to the precision  of the 
12 empirical  choice proportions  associated  with each alternative  in each choice set. 13 
14 Otherwise, sample size is dictated by numbers of choice sets and numbers  of versions. 
15 
16 Our empirical  experience is that one rarely requires more than 20 respondents  per 
17 
18 version  to estimate  reliable models,  but undertaking significant post-hoc analysis to 
19 identify and estimate  covariate effects, invariably  requires  larger sample sizes.  See 20 









30 Methods  of data collection  are well-documented[?OJ, but we note that self-complete 
31 postal DCE surveys are common in health, often resulting  in low response rates[B] 
32 
33 Face to face interviews  also are used, but mini labs where respondents  complete 
34 
35 DCEs in central locations  or online surveys may be more cost effective[?O] Mode of 
36  data collection  is influenced  by study objectives; different  modes may involve 37 
38 different  biases which are well-documented elsewhere[?O] Issues to consider are 
39 
40  summarised in section 9 of Table II. 
41 
42 






50 Coding of explanatory  variables  is important for analysis and interpretation of 
51 
52  results, particularly  ASCs and interactions.   Typically,  effects coding or dummy 
53 
54 variable  coding are used, particularly  for qualitative attributes.   Mean-centring 














approximated by a MIXL.  MIXL has more flexible substitution patterns and 
accommodates the panel nature ofDCE data by allowing correlation within subjects 








4 matrices used to estimate interactions.  Several studies in health economics used 
5 31  32  36 
6 effects codes (eg, [    •        • l); the importance of using these codes is highlighted by 
7 Bech and Gyrd-Hansen (200st'] It is worth noting that the estimate of the omitted 
8 
9 level of an effects-coded attribute is simply minus one times the sum of the estimated 
10 
11 levels.  Table I shows an example of effects coding for a 4-level attribute.  As can be 
12 seen in the table, this is very similar to dummy coding in that only L-llevels (3 in this 13 
14 case) are coded, with the omitted L-th level on each effects coded variable coded -I 
15 
16 rather than 0. Coding is considered in section 10 of Table II. 
17 
18 
19 Insert Table I 20 
21 
22 
23 Forms of choice models 
24 
25 
26 The form of the estimated IUF depends on I) the experimental design and 
27 
28 whether interaction effects are identified and/or alternatives are labelled, and 2) the 
29 
30 type of choice modelled (binary choices imply binary models; multiple choices imply 
31 multinomial models).  For example, the conditionallogit model (CLM) of equation 
32 
33 (4) is a fixed effects logit model that provides a closed form solution for the choice 
34 
35 probabilities and is easily estimated.  A key property of the CLM associated with the 
36  iid assumption is the Independence oflrrelevant Alternatives (IIA) that implies 37 
38 proportional substitutability across alternatives[46 
39 
Whether IIA holds is an empirical 
40  question, tests for which are outlined in Train (2002i46 
41 
42 
43 Different choice models arise from different assumptions about distributions and 44 
45 properties of error components and about variance-covariance matrices of preference 
46 
47 parameters.  For example, the nested logit model relaxes IIA by allowing violations of 
48  IIA between nests, while requiring IIA to hold within nests.  Other models that relax 
 
50 IIA include multinomial probit (in health see for eg, [38  ) and mixed logit (MIXL) (in 
51 
52  health see for eg, [ 23• 58  72 ) to name two. •        ] 
53 
54 


















4 by allowing parameters to vary randomly across individuals by including a respondent 
5 
6 specific stochastic component: /3,  = f3 + /1, where f3  is the mean parameter vector for 
7 
8 the population and /1, is the individual specific deviation from the mean.  One must 
9 
10 specify a distribution for each {3; and estimate the parameters of that distribution (ie, 
11 
12 mean and standard deviation).  MIXL does not have a closed form solution, requiring 
13 simulated maximum likelihood estimation (or hierarchical hayes for the Bayesian 14 
15 versions).  Other models that relax IIA include latent class models[74l and 
16 
17 heteroscedastic error variance models[66• 75  76 While highly flexible, a potential •        ] 
18 
19 problem with these models is that it is unlikely that error variances are constant within 
20 or between individuals[45 • 64  65  77• 78   in which case, model parameters are confounded •        • ] 21 
22  with the unobserved distribution of error variances. 
23 
24 
25 Regardless of the type of choice model estimated, the functional forms of individual 26 
27 variables should be informed by economic theory whenever possible.  In addition, we 
28 
29 recommend estimating a model in the most disaggregated form by including 
30 
31 parameter estimates for L-1 attribute levels, then graphing these estimates against the 
32 levels of each attribute to visualise implied functional forms. This allows recoding 
33 
34 andre-estimation of more parsimonious models using the implied specification.  For 
35 
36  example, if a graph suggests that the estimated utilities increase at a decreasing rate 
37 with the levels of a numerical attribute, a quadratic or logarithmic specification may 38 
39  be appropriate[79 
40 
For labelled DCEs with J alternatives, ASC for J-1 alternatives 
41 should be included which represent the underlying preference for each alternative 
42 
43 when attributes are set to zero.  Naturally, specifications with interactions, socio- 
44 demographic variables and covariates should be estimated as appropriate. 45 
46 
47 
48  Log likelihood and pseudo R-squared values can inform goodness of fit of estimated 
49 models.  Model selection is informed by I) economic and behavioural theory and 2) 50 
51 statistical considerations like likelihood ratio tests for nested models and the Akaike 
52 
53 Information Criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) for non 
54 
55 nested models.  Issues to consider in undertaking or reviewing econometric analysis 












because attribute impacts and the positions of each attribute level on the underlying 
 









5 Validity ofDCEs  is relatively well-established in the broader literature[ 
 





9 economics[ll, 62  so]  There have been relatively few tests of external validity in health, 
10 
11 perhaps due to limited RP data, although Mark and Swait (2004i8'l found evidence of 
12 external validity in prescribing decisions for alcoholism medication,  Instead, the 13 
14 focus has been on internal validity, usually limited to checking if signs of estimated 
15 
16 parameters are consistent with a priori expectations; some researchers have tested if 
17 
18 results conform with the axioms of consumer theory (eg, completeness, monotonicity 
19 and transitivity[82-84l)_  Similarly, researchers also have studied 'rationality' of choices, 20 
21 defining 'irrational' responses by failure of non satiation or lexicographic preferences 
22 
23 (the latter, in fact, are not irrational), using tests to exclude "irrational" individuals 
24 from analysis_ Lancsar and Louviere (2006)[42 25 
 
discuss several problems in testing 
26 "rationality", including the fact that apparent "irrationality" can be due to I) 
27 
28 shortcomings in design and implementation ofDCEs; 2) respondent learning about 
29 
30 their preferences or tasks; 3) "irrationality" tests not being conclusive; 4) using 
31 fractional factorials, which cannot identify unique decision rules_ They also provide 
32 
33 evidence that RUT can cope with such preferences_ Deleting respondents may omit 
34 
35 valid preferences leading to bias and lower statistical efficiency,  Indeed, internal 
36  validity is broader than econometric testing; for example, well-designed and 37 
38 implemented studies that are consistent with the previous discussion and the checklist 
39 
40  of issues to consider at each stage of undertaking/reviewing a DCE provided in Table 
41 
42 II give more confidence in results_ Validity is considered in section 12 of Table IL 
43 
44 
45 4,3 Interpretation, derivation  of welfare measures  & other policy analysis 
46 
47 
48  Once a preference model (the IUF) is estimated, it can be used in policy analyses in 
 
50 various ways, such as comparing the relative importance of product/program 
51 
52  attributes_ For example, is test accuracy relatively more important to patients than 
53 
54 time spent waiting for results when choosing diagnostic tests?  Many studies measure 
55 the relative impact of attributes by comparing size and significance of estimated 56 






















4 levels need not be the same for each attributet9 
5 
To measure relative attribute 
6 impacts one needs to measure each on a common, comparable, scale.  See section 13 
7 of Table II.  Lancsar, Louviere and Flynn (2007t9J  discuss five ways to compare 
8 
9 relative attribute impact, some of which we discuss below. 
10 
11 
12 Predicted probability analysis 13 
14 
15 
16 The probability that respondents will choose each alternative in a choice set is 
17 
18 calculated using equation (4), which also allows comparison of the impact of each 
19 attribute in a common metric[31• 32• 79 20 
In the case of non-closed form models, the 
21 choice probabilities need to be simulated to approximate the integration over choice 
22 
23 situations/respondents, but otherwise, the process is the same.  Predicted probabilities 
24 also are used to evaluate expected market shares in marketing applications, and an 25 
26 obvious analogue in health is predicting uptake or choice shares for the sample that 
27 
28 provided choices.  To predict beyond the sample requires recalibration ofDCE  results 
29 
30 which is appropriate when market data are available. 
31 
32 
33 Marginal rates of substitution (10RS) 
34 
35 
36  DCEs allow estimation of tradeoffs that respondents make between attributes, 37 
38 or their MRS[24  26• ss]  Following standard consumer theory, MRS is calculated by 
39 
40  partially differentiating the IUF, equation (2), with respect to the first attribute and 
41 





MRSx  x (7) 





52  where Vis an IUF and X, and X 2   are attributes of the good/service.  The numerator 
53 
54 (denominator) is interpreted as the marginal utility of attribute I (2).  If price is the 
55 numeraire, the denominator denotes the marginal dis utility of price, and we term the 56 





















4 linear utility functions  can be used to investigate  attribute  impact, but the calculation 
5 
6 is more complex  as explained  by Lancsar, Louviere  and Flynn (2007). 
7 
8 
9 Welfare Measures to value health and healthcare 
10 
11 
12 DCEs are flexible,  which is an advantage  for welfare measurement because 13 
14 the value of an entire good/service and different  configurations of goods/services can 
15 
16 be estimated.   The method of calculating  Hicksian  compensating variation  (CV) in 
17 
18 discrete choice random utility models was introduced  to health economics  to calculate 
19 welfare measures from DCEs by Lancsar (2002)[!] and Lancsar  and Savage (2004i36l, 20 
21 and is due to Small and Rosen (1981)[86 
22 
The CV method can calculate measures  of 
23 welfare gain, or WTP, for entire products/programs, and can measure the relative 
24 impacts of each attribute in a common monetary  metric as willingness  to pay or 25 
26 accept compensation for changes  in a given attribute.   For a conditionallogit model, 
27 
28 both forms of welfare measures  are calculated  using the utility estimates  and attribute 
29 









where  A is the marginal utility of income;  V ° and V 1  are the value of the IUF for 
1 1 
40 
41 each choice option   j before and after the policy change, respectively; and  J  is the 
42 
43 number  of options in the choice set. 
44 
45 
46 Hicksian  CV basically values a change in expected  utility due to a change in the 
47 
48  attribute(s),  by weighting  this change by the marginal utility of income. It takes 
49 
50 account of the uncertainty in the choice model about which alternative  respondents 
51 will choose and/or whether  respondents  substitute  among alternatives  following  a 52 
53 change in the desirability  of one or more alternatives.   Again, for non-closed form 
54 
55 models, the CV needs to be simulated[
33
 Equation (8) also can be used to calculate 
56 the CV using non monetary  metrics; for example Baker eta!(2008)[ 86 57 calculated 
















6 The product of the sum of MRS and the change in the attributes of interest has been 
7 used in health economics to calculate WTP for goods/services. However, as Lancsar 
8 
9 and Savage (2004i36l note, that approach is generally inappropriate for welfare 
10 
11 measurement and instead the theoretically consistent method in equation (8) should be 
12 used.  Both MRS and WTP are random variables, so the uncertainty or variance in the 13 
14 resulting values can be captured by estimating confidence intervals.  Risa Hole 
15 
16 (2007i87J provides a useful review and comparison of methods available to calculate 
17 
18 confidence intervals.  Issues to check regarding interpretation ofDCE  results and 
19 welfare and policy analysis are included in sections 13 and 14 of Table II. 20 
21 
22 
23 Insert Table II 
24 
25 
26 Of course, DCEs have potential limitations.  As the forgoing suggests, designing, 
27 
28 undertaking and interpreting DCEs can be a time consuming and involved process. 
29 
30 Thus, it is important to consider before commencing a study whether a DCE in fact is 
31 the most suitable method for the research question.  DCEs can be cognitively 
32 
33 demanding for respondents.  Generalisability of results may be an issue in economic 
34 
35 evaluation depending on how the DCE is designed and administered[". "l; a new DCE 
36  may be required for each research question, although due the flexibility ofDCEs 37 
38 several versions of a program or treatment can to be valued within a single study.  We 
39 
40  return to some of these issues in the next section. 
41 
42 
43 5. The research  frontier 44 
45 
46 
47 A number of issues remain on the research frontier associated with the DCE approach 
48  in general, and health applications specifically.  For example, there is scope to move 
 
50 beyond simplistic and ad hoc use of qualitative methods to develop DCEs, to 
51 
52  (iteratively) apply more sophisticated qualitative tools before, alongside and after 
53 
54 quantitative data collection.  Ideally, what is required is theory or at least a systematic 
55 approach to qualitative research (including pilot testing) for developing and testing 56 
57 DCEs.  Progress in this area is exemplified by Coast (2007)[53l, but qualitative 
58 

















4 Challenges remain in developing optimal design theory for alternative specific or 
5 
6 labelled choices as well as choice sets with individual-specific status quo options. 
7 Also, as more complex and flexible IUFs and choice models are used, optimal design 
8 
9 theory is needed to support such specifications.  Likewise, larger designs naturally 
10 
11 lead to blocking choice sets into versions, requiring statistical guidelines for not only 
12 how to construct optimally efficient DCEs, but how to optimise allocation of resulting 13 
14 choice sets into blocks.  As DCEs become more complex, we need to better 
15 
16 understand the relationships between design efficiency and respondent efficiency 
17 
18 (influenced in part by cognitive burden), which remains under-researched despite 
19 some work[67• 88  89 Further work is also required on the nature of the potential bias •        ] 20 
21 from using designs that ignore interactions. 
22 
23 
24 Sample size is another practical area warranting further research. This is likely to be 25 
26 challenging because estimation of sample sizes requires knowledge of the unknown 
27 
28 parameter estimates a priori.  A potentially fruitful research avenue would be to use 
29 
30 pilot tests to estimate parameter values to use in sample size calculations for a more 




35 Analysis of DCEs in health has primarily focused on response means, but variances of 
36  outcome distributions and error components warrant attention[45 • 64• 65  n] Similarly, 37 
38 models that can deal with issues associated with differences in variance-scale ratios, 
39 
40  or more generally, non-constant error variances, are needed, as noted in Section 3. 
41 
42 Accounting for unobserved variability and preference heterogeneity is important, as 
43 are the relative merits of various ways to do this.  Theory and methods have been 44 
45 developed to allow one to model the choices of single individuals, which eliminates a 
46 
47 need to make distributional assumptions about preference heterogeneity[67 
48 
49 
50 DCEs can isolate and measure patient preferences, but decisions about health care 
51 
52  treatment can involve joint decisions between patients and their doctors[ 90  91 •        ] 
53 
54 Opportunities exist to use DCEs to investigate agency relationships in health as in 
55 other sectors[92l, which complements investigating patient preferences.  For example, 
56 
57 Bartels eta!(2006i 92l used two DCEs, one for consumers and one for providers with 
58 



















4 analysis  in the health sector.  Another extension  includes  modelling  multi-stage 
5 
6 choice processes  which can include quantities  chosen and changes  in choices over 
7 time[45 ' 65 
8 
Integration  of more behavioural  theory, and incorporating contributions 
9 from various fields like psychology  should be beneficiaL 
10 
11 
12 Generalisability ofDCE results is a key research need because it relates to factors  like 13 
14 time, context and geography  that often are constant in single data sources[93 
15 
Thus, 
16 we need to understand  their effects, including  on unobserved  variability,  Similarly, 
17 
18 work is needed on the extent to which DCEs can be used in benefit transfer, similar to 
19 applications  in the contingent valuation  literature[94 20 
Indeed, DCEs may be well- 
21 suited to benefit transfer applications  as they are more general and flexible about the 
22 
23 composition of goods/services than contingent valuation, which may make 
24 transferability easier. 25 
26 
27 
28 Despite prior work on "rationality" ofDCE responses,  many tests focused  on axioms 
29 
30 not strictly required for rationality,   Work focusing  on axioms of transitivity  and 
31 completeness and tests of the weak and strong axioms of revealed  preference  would 
32 
33 be welcome,   Also, evidence that respondents  may not use compensatory decision 
34 
35 making rules (IUFs) suggests  that more work is needed to understand  if/when 
36  alternative  decision rules or heuristics  are used[82  95 37 '   ] 
38 
39 
40  A new type of choice experiment called "Best-Worst Scaling" (BWS) is garnering 
41 
42 attention  in health economics  and more broadly,   BWS' underlying  theoretical 
43 properties  were formally  proven by Marley and Louviere  (2005)[96 44 and Marley 
45 Louviere  and Flynn (2008i97 
46 
Thus far two types ofBWS have been used in health 
47 economics: I) asking respondents  to choose the best and worst attribute level in 
48 
49 several single profiles, which potentially  allows one to estimate the importance  of 
50 each attribute  and measure them on a common  scale[79  98  99l; and 2) asking '   ' 
51 
52  respondents  to choose the best and worst alternatives  in each of several choice sets, 
53 
54 allowing  one to observe many more choices without increasing  numbers  of choice 




















4 evaluation. DCEs allow estimation  of theoretically consistent measures of welfare 
5 36  37 
6 gain or WTP[ l, suggesting they can be used in CBA; and Mcintosh (2006)[   ] 
7 proposes a framework for development of DCE-derived  CBAs in health.  Similarly, 
8 
9 DCEs could also be used to inform CUA.  In particular,  DCEs potentially  can be used 
10 
11 to derive utility weights for calculating QALYs.  This requires further research  and 
12  comparison to more standard methods  such as TTO, SG, VAS and would require a 13 
14 large scale study to investigate population values.  Finally, and perhaps  more 
15 
16 interestingly, there is scope to elicit both health and non health related utility 
17 
18 potentially to be used directly in CUA (along the lines of a 'Super  QALY'[lOll). 
19 Considerable work would be required to test if this is feasible.   The ability to measure 20 
21 outcomes  (in utility or monetary  measures)  using DCEs offers additional  'tools' for 
22 
23 the health economists' 'tool kit'. 
24 
25 
26  DCEs have been embedded  in RCTs[32   102l, and are likely to be included  more 
27 
28 routinely  in RCTs as they become more mainstream  in economic  evaluation.   There 
29 
30 also may be a role for DCEs in the expanded  remit of the National Institute for Health 
31 and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK, which includes economic evaluations of 32 
33 population health initiatives  since a key issue in such evaluations  is 
34 
35 participation/uptake, areas where DCEs can be useful.  DCEs also may be useful for 
36 priority setting[103l, including  serving as a component  of priority setting  tools like 37 




42 6. Conclusion 
43 
44 
45 We reviewed  and discussed  the application and development ofDCEs  in health 
46 
47 economics  more than 15 years after the first application.  We also provided a checklist 
48 
of issues to consider  when developing or reviewing  the quality  of a DCE.  Of course, 49 
50 DCEs are not a panacea,  but if appropriately designed,  implemented, analysed  and 51 
52  interpreted, offer rich sources of information to inform economic evaluation  and 
53 
54 decision making more broadly  in the health sector.  Thus, they offer viable 
















4 In 2002, Viney, Lancsar and Louviere["] noted: "Given the growth in the number of 
5 
6 applications of DCEs in health in the last 5 years and the potential areas where DCEs 
7 could contribute to policy and resource allocation, it is likely that they will become a 
8 
9 standard tool in health economics research over the next 5 years, although it may be 
10 
11 longer before they become a standard tool for health policy."  Five years on this 
12 seems an accurate prediction, DCEs are a standard health economics research tool; 13 
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